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IS ABSOLUTE IDEALISM SOLIPSISTIC?

THE possibility of solipsism and its consequences is one of many important philosophic questions which after long and undue neglect seem now at length to be attracting attention. The question of solipsism in its various aspects has a most vital bearing on the ultimate problems of metaphysics. It is easy to see that every idealistic way of interpreting experience can not honestly avoid an explicit and exhaustive discussion of its relations to solipsism. For every approach to idealism is so closely beset on either side by the precipices of solipsism that every step has to be careful, and a false step must at once be fatal. The course of realistic philosophies, no doubt, is in this respect less dangerous; but they, too, are interested in the problem. They have a direct interest in precipitating all idealisms into solipsism. They tend, however, to treat it too lightly as a *reductio ad absurdum,* without sufficiently explaining why. Its absurdity appears to be regarded as practical rather than as theoretical, but even so the instinctive feeling that solipsism 'won't do' should be elaborated into a conclusive proof that it must of necessity lead to impracticable consequences. Lastly, as a final proof of the prevalent vagueness of philosophic thought on this subject, it may be mentioned that it has even been debated whether radical empiricism is not solipsistic.[1]

It would seem, therefore, decidedly opportune to inquire further into the philosophic affinities of solipsism, and more particularly into its unexplored relations to absolute idealism. For that form of idealism has hitherto escaped suspicion by reason of the loudness of its protestations against solipsism. But such excessive protests are themselves suspicious, and it should not be surprising to find that whether or not solipsism is a bad thing and an untenable, whether or not other idealisms can escape from it, absolute idealism, at all events, contains implications which reduce it to a choice between solipsism and suicide.

[1] See this JOURNAL, Vol. II., No. 5 and Vol. II., No. 9.

To show this, our first step will have to be the amending of the current definition of solipsism. For by reason, doubtless, of the scarcity or non-existence of solipsists interested in their own proper definition, its statement is usually defective. When solipsism is defined as the doctrine that *as all experience is my experience, I alone exist,* it is taken for granted (1) that there can be only one solipsist, and (2) that he must be 'I' and not 'you.'

Both of these assumptions, however, are erroneous. Indeed, the full atrocity of solipsism only reveals itself when it is perceived that solipsists may exist in the plural, and attempt to conceive *me* as parts of *them.* The definition, therefore, of solipsism must not content itself with providing for the existence of a single solipsist, *i. e.,* with stating how 'I' could define 'my' solipsism (if I were a solipsist). It should provide me also with a basis for argument against 'your' solipsism and that of others. For that is the really intolerable annoyance of solipsism. If I felt reckless or strong enough to shoulder the responsibility, I might not object to a solipsism that made *me* the all by emphasizing the inevitable relation of experience to an experient: the trouble comes when *other* experients claim a monopoly of this relation in the face of conflicting claims, and propose to reduce *me* to incidents in *their* cosmic nightmare.

Solipsism, therefore, should be conceived with greater generality. It should cover the doctrine that the whole of reality has a single owner and is relative to a single experient, and that beyond such an experient nothing further need be assumed, without implying that I am the only 'I' that owns the universe. *Any 'I' will do.* Any I that thinks it is all that is, is a solipsist. And solipsism will be true if *any one* of the many 'I's' that are, or may be, solipsists is right, and really is all that is. Provided, of course, he knows it.

How, now, can this amended definition be applied to the case of absolute idealism? We must note first that my (our) experience is not to be regarded as wholly irrelevant to that philosophy. Indeed, in all its forms it seems to rest essentially on an argument from the ideality of my (our) experience to the ideality of all experience. For the former is taken as proof that all reality is relative to a knower, who, however, is not necessarily the individual knower, but may (or must) be an all-embracing subject, sustaining us and all the world besides. Indeed absolute idealists have so convinced themselves of the moral and spiritual superiority of their absolute knower that they habitually speak in terms of contemptuous disparagement of their 'private self' as 'a miserable abstraction.'[2] And from the standpoint of their private self such language is no doubt justified:

[2] *E. g.,* Mr. Bradley: 'Appearance and Reality,' p. 259.

it inflicts on it salutary humiliations and represses any tendency it might otherwise have to expand itself solipsistically into the all.

But how does it look from the standpoint of the absolute self? For that, too, has been conceived as a self, and therefore as capable of raising solipsistic claims. Can the absolute self be deterred from excesses of self-elation by the reflection that it is not, after all, the totality of existence? Assuredly not: for *ex hypothesi* that is precisely what it is. It includes all things and is all things in all things. If it can not be said to 'create' all things, it is only on the technical ground that since a subject implies an object, and the world must be coeternal with its 'creator,' 'creation' is an impossible idea. Nevertheless, the dependence of all things on the absolute self must be absolute. *And if it is conscious, it must know this.* For else the ultimate truth about reality would be hidden from the absolute knower, though apparently revealed to the (comparative) ignorance of quite a number of philosophers.

But is not this equivalent to saying (1) that *the absolute must be a solipsist,* and (2) that *solipsism is the absolute truth?*

The inference is plain, and confirmed also by the admirable fitness of the absolute to play the solipsist in other ways. For the arguments against solipsism have derived what success they have achieved from the habit of conceiving it as the freak of an individual self: they recoil helplessly from an absolute solipsism. Even Mr. Bradley would probably admit, *e. g.,* that the absolute, being out of time, would not be perplexed by the necessity of transcending its present experience in order to complete itself.[3]

[3] Though it is not perhaps strictly necessary, I may here note that Mr. Bradley's refutation of solipsism in 'Appearance and Reality,' ch. XXI., seems to fail for (at least) three reasons. (1) Solipsism no doubt does not rest upon 'direct' experience merely, *i. e.,* it is not a congenital, but an acquired, theory. Still 'indirect' experience must sooner or later return to and enter into direct present experience, under penalty of ceasing to be 'experience' at all. And so the solipsistic hypothesis, though doubtless it is not what any one starts with, may suggest itself as the explanation of experience and be confirmed, even as the solipsistic interpretation of part of it, *viz.,* our dream-experience, is now confirmed, namely by the discovery that there is after all nothing in direct experience which forbids its adoption. Mr. Bradley, therefore, fails to pin solipsism down to the alternative 'based either on direct or on indirect experience.' It can rest on *both.* (2) He objects to the enriching of the 'this' of direct experience by the results of indirect experience, on the ground that they are *imported, i. e.,* were not *originally* in it (p. 251). Yet on p. 254 he disavows the relevance of the argument from origins! (3) His argument never really gets to, and consequently never really gets at, the solipsistic standpoint, and he always presupposes the more usual assumptions as to 'a palpable community of the private self with the universe.' But the solipsist has not, and can not have, a private self to distinguish (except in appearance) from the universe, just because he is a solipsist and includes all things. His position, therefore, leaves no foothold for Mr. Bradley's argument.

But though the inference from absolute idealism to solipsism seems unavoidable, it would be affectation to pretend that it involves no difficulties. I do not count among these the fact that it will probably be exceedingly unpalatable to absolute idealists, and may even compel them to temper their denunciations of subjective idealism. For, after all, they are men (by their own confession) accustomed to follow truth wheresoever she flits, and to sacrifice their personal feelings. But there does seem to arise a deplorable difficulty about bringing into accord the absolute's point of view with our own.

For the absolute, solipsism is true and forms a standpoint safe, convenient and irrefragable. But for us there arises an antinomy. We have on the one hand to admit that solipsism is absolute truth, seeing that the standpoint of the absolute is absolute truth, and that our imperfect human truth is relative to this standard. If, therefore, solipsism is true *sub specie absoluti,* and we can know it to be so, we ought to think it so. We ought, that is, to think it true that 'I am all that is.' The absolute has proved it. And not only for itself, but equally for any other 'I.' For regarded as a function to which all experience is related, no 'I' differs from any other. Any 'I,' therefore, may claim to profit by the truth of solipsism. It will be awkward, no doubt, at first to have to conceive a plurality of solipsists, each claiming to be the sole and sufficient reason for the existence of everything—but I suppose we might get used to that. It seems, however, a more serious implication that each of them, if his claim were admitted, would render superfluous the assumption of an absolute knower beyond himself. Instead of being absorbed in the absolute, as heretofore, each individual solipsist would swallow up the absolute. This consequence may seem bizarre, but does it not follow from the premises?

The same conclusion follows also in another way. The absolute *ex hypothesi* is and owns each 'private self.' And the absolute is a solipsist. This feature, therefore, of the truth must be reflected in each private self. They must all be solipsists. But this is merely the truth of solipsism looked at from the standpoint of the private self. It must claim to be all because the absolute is all and it is the absolute as alone the absolute can be known. The absorption of the absolute and the individual thus is mutual, because it is merely the same truth of their community of substance differently viewed.

On the other hand, it seems most unfortunate that in practice we all negate the truth of solipsism, and, absolute or no, must continue so to do. Even if the impracticability of solipsism had been exaggerated, and philosophy had been too hasty in assuming this, the working assumptions of ordinary life would be rendered ridicu-

lous, and our feelings would be hurt, if solipsism were true. It may be said, however, that the practical absurdity and inconvenience of a theory is no argument against it, at least in the eyes of intellectualism.

But even waiving this, does it not remain an intellectual difficulty that we have ourselves destroyed the path that led from idealism to the absolute? The absolute was reached (rightly or wrongly) as a way of avoiding the solipsistic interpretation of experience, which it was feared idealism might otherwise entail. It now turns out that the absolute itself insists on the truth of solipsism. And yet if solipsism is true, there is no reason at all for transcending the individual experience of each solipsist! It would seem, therefore, that we can not admit the truth of solipsism without ruining our absolute, nor admit our absolute without admitting the truth of solipsism. We are eternally condemned, therefore, *either* to labor under an illusion, *viz.*, that that is false which is really true, and which we really know to be true though we can not treat it as true without leaving our only standpoint, the human, *or* to reject the very source and standard of truth itself.

In conclusion, I can only very briefly indicate what seems to me to be a way by which absolute idealism can escape these difficulties, even though it may perhaps lead to further troubles. Of course, from the standpoint of absolute idealism the truth of solipsism is only valid if the absolute is assumed to be conscious. We can, therefore, avoid the fatal admission by assuming that it is not. The absolute, that is, is unconscious mind, as von Hartmann long ago contended. But what is unconscious mind? The inherent weakness of the 'proof' of absolute idealism lies in its proceeding from the finite human mind, which we know, to an 'infinite' non-human mind very imperfectly analogous to it, and (apparently) incapable of being known by us. This transition becomes more and more hazardous the further we depart from the analogy with human minds. It may fairly be disputed, therefore, whether there is any sense in calling an unconscious mind a mind at all. But if the unconscious absolute ceases to be conceived as mind, what becomes of the idealistic side of absolutism? Among the absolutists many, no doubt, would be quite willing (under pressure) to move towards the conclusions thus outlined; but would not this involve a final breach with their theological allies, to whom the chief attraction of absolute idealism has always been that it appeared to provide for a 'spiritual' view of existence? But possibly neither philosophy nor theology would suffer irreparable loss by the self-elimination of absolute idealism.

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THE INTERPRETATION OF A SYSTEM FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY

WE may assume two attitudes towards the works of men; we may interpret them, or, going a step farther, estimate them according to our own or the artist's ideal. The one is the function of the historian, the other the function of the critic who is to educate men to do better next time. You interpret the Zeus of Phidias, Dante's Divine Comedy, or Wagner's Parsifal. You apply your criticisms to works that pretend to contribute to modern progress, as, for instance, a play by Maeterlinck, a new cure, or a new system of philosophy.

Sometimes, however, the very latest systems defy the critic; he may adjudge them stillborn because they do not conform to his standard: nevertheless they will prove very much alive. Buechner's 'Force and Matter' was in its time the gospel of many thousands. Haeckel's 'Riddle of the Universe' was not swept into oblivion by a flood of most expert criticism. Of these two I was vividly reminded by Mr. Franklin's 'Socialization of Humanity.'[1] All three are the work of amateurs in philosophy, and have been or are still satisfying the demands of a large class of people for a systematic arrangement of experience. The most profitable thing, then, seems to be an attempt at interpretation. The more so because the works of the amateur in their unguarded boldness of reasoning offer splendid opportunities for trapping and snap-shooting the philosophizing mind when it transforms by secret processes the raw material of experience into the finished product of a system of metaphysics.

Now if science is first of all an ever-increasing minuteness of description by differentiation, if it is this to-day from the point of view of evolution, history of philosophy will not fulfill this modern requirement unless it describes philosophizing man in his evolutionary stages. The amateur philosopher, then, if I may use the terms of anthropogeny, represents the still extant, though yet unappreciated, link between the expert of to-day, on the one side, and the layman who has ever reasoned and is still reasoning from analogy to systems of anthropomorphic imagery, on the other. The amateur employs the abstract language of the former, but, neither grasping the difficulty of his problems nor familiar with the extent of their solution, reveals by the recklessness of his reasoning the

[1] 'The Socialization of Humanity.' An analysis and synthesis of the phenomena of nature, life and society through the law of repetition. A system of monistic philosophy, by Chas. Kendall Franklin. Chicago: Chas. H. Kerr & Co., 1904. Pp. viii + 477.

personal equation almost as clearly as the layman manifests his will to believe without hiding behind clever argumentation. Mr. Franklin appears to be an amateur in philosophy. Let us see whether he lays bare some of the hidden ways of the philosophizing mind.

He says (187) the popular view of our situation was correctly stated by a laboring man when the author was a child of seven; he still remembers the striking words: "It is live hard, work hard, die hard, and go to hell at last!" He himself seems still to hold a similar view; our every-day life with its struggle for existence, its panics, its poverty, its insecurity, its wars, is in his opinion little better than savagery (186). The church is said to be the cause of all this misery; her theological conception of the universe prevents man from improving this earthly life. The bits of description strewn over more than four hundred pages, and some information received in answer to my questionnaire concerning the natural history of the thinker, make me infer that the church here denotes the conception and political organization of Christianity against which Voltaire declaimed his 'Écrasez l'infame,' against which the German Social Democracy thundered her ban up to the year 1885, and which the materialist thinkers and politically interested scientists of Europe about 1860 feared and hated as the staunch supporter of all reactionary policies. Witness, as the last survivals of that metaphysical mood, Haeckel in his earlier philosophical writings, Renan in the preface to his 'Souvenirs' and still to-day Bertholet in his last volume on 'Science et Libre Pensée.' Whence, however, so much bitterness and misjudgment in our author, especially here in America, which has never known the political contrast between a conservative majority within the state church and the followers of liberalism?

When Franklin was about thirteen, one day coming home from work with an elder companion, he denied the existence of God because he could not reconcile the evil he saw in nature and society with the idea of an all-powerful God; and still to-day he thinks the argument from injustice most convincing and indisputable.[2] To mention a greater name, J. S. Mill thought so too, and never ceased to think so even when in later life he had to accept an evil and a good God. As regards our philosopher, two causes seem to have contributed to making permanent the sway of this argument. The first is his being struck by life's misery too hard in his boyhood days. When still an immature boy of eleven he was forced to quit school and earn a living. Any drudgery will be painful to a boy of that age and interfere with his smooth development from the self-centered boy to the society-centered adolescent. The boy has social instinct

[2] Chap. XVI., 'The God and Immortality Hypothesis.'

enough to respect the group of boys to which he belongs. The only demand he makes upon that group is the demand for a square deal; justice or, better, equality is the supreme law of his life. Any community, small or large, be it even God's, in which a boy must work more than he is able or in which man suffers without good reason, appears to the boy as an unjust organization. However deeply religious the child may have been, the boy rebels against an unjust God like the primitive man who punishes his idols for neglect or misdemeanor; the more so because for the first time conscious of his power to handle a few abstract terms, he judges all things, mercilessly applying the Procrustean bed of his narrow system of thought.

The second cause is a low degree of the teleological vision in the adolescence of our philosopher. When at seventeen be became 'thoughtful about life, what it meant and what his duty was,' he was forced during a Methodist revival to surrender his scepticism and for a time acknowledge the truth of orthodox Christianity. He, however, commenced at once to study the Bible, and the more he studied it the less he believed in it, without having yet looked into the writings of men like Conybear, M. J. Savage, W. H. Mallock and Tom Paine. If I may state in a few words what other individual analyses shall bring out more fully, this continued critical attitude of the adolescent philosopher means to me that the five features of the teleological vision—the emotion of optimism, the emotion of the unity of the universe, the emotion of one's humble place in a purposeful universe, the communistic emotion of love, and the communistic volition of equality and sacrifice—were not so intensely experienced in his 'first conversion' as to undo his boyhood reasoning by opening a view into a vaster and more purposeful universe than the boy had ever known. The several individual purposes of this spiritual world may be hidden from our vision, but appear as firmly established as the whole mental experience which announces to the boy the advent of his adolescence. Thus Carlyle ('Sartor Resartus'), although for ten years rather believing in the Devil and a society subject to him and hostile to the struggling youth, finally, in his twenty-fourth year, had his 'conversion' or 'fire-baptism' on Leith walk and realized the larger spiritual world of the German idealists. Franklin himself seems to think that his having had no particular religious training determined the light transitory character of his first 'conversion.' Herbert Spencer rather felt the other way, that his mental make-up would never have responded to any religious training, however judiciously applied. Leaving aside Mill's case as one-sided over-feeding and artificial deformation of the mind, both may be right, representing different species of mental constitution, especially so because our author now,

in the maturity of his manhood, knows, like any true positivist, the ecstasies of religion.

But whatever have been the causes, the boyhood reasoning from the analogy of tribal equality to man's place in the universe has been firmly fixed once for all. So the author's preachment on man as 'a being unfavored, unfriended by the Infinite' (4) still reveals a metaphysical mood that since his boyhood feels, as it were, the world to be split into two hostile camps. This mood manifesting itself from time to time in emotions of a dualistic view of life appears to be an especially common, though transitory, disease of the adolescent, a disease which results from his struggle to adapt himself to life under the new stimulus of his ideals. However, it may also become chronic or at least permanently affect the intellectual life of the mature man; it is then accompanied by, or evident in, a tendency to antithetical reasoning which leaves the affected individual unaware of the relativity of values and knowledge, and prevents him in many cases from conceiving impartial judgments. Witness Saint Paul and Augustine, or Tolstoy and Carlyle. Tolstoy was not able to adapt himself for any length of time to the life of the upper classes of Russian society, because it was not suited to his spiritual nature; therefore he began to hate and to reject not only that life, but also western civilization represented by it, as altogether immoral, and to love and to believe in the life of the peasant and its spiritual possibilities. Carlyle struggled for ten years with what he called the materialism and atheism of Edinburgh society; it did not satisfy his metaphysical and spiritual needs and, worst of all, it did not seem to have a place for him. When the final unification of his mind started in with reaching the 'Center of Indifference,' he had grown the antithetical thinker and moralizing critic which he remained to the end. An almost perfect record of such growth has been written by a master hand in 'Sartor Resartus,' especially in the 'Sorrows of Teufelsdrökh' and the chapters following. A similar struggle seems to resound in page 246 of Mr. Franklin's book, where the author tells us that religion is the joy of man's life. When a youth he desires to do something for the betterment of the race, being by nature a reformer. He is intoxicated with his dream. But he attempts to do things and fails. His enthusiasm dies out, and at thirty all the dreams of his youth disappear and his ideals are dead. To venture a psychological interpretation, at thirty Mr. Franklin had completed the critical period of adolescence which, in his case, at first modified, later on destroyed, the metaphysical system taught to the child and the boy by his surroundings during the years of mental dependence. He must have been for years without faith in any satisfactory order of the universe. When at twenty-two the

constructive period of his adolescence set in, overlapping the critical one, it took him yet at least eight years to conceive the central idea of his system around which his metaphysical thoughts might crystallize into unity. These eight years of his life without spiritual unity and support may easily have worn out the ideal will for a time.

However, most people do not take up the work of their manhood without any faith. So it is only natural that, as I am told, the positive beliefs of his manhood came to our thinker between his thirtieth and his fortieth year. It must have been at thirty or shortly thereafter that he 'experienced the profoundest surprise' in learning God to be an allegory only for tribe or nation or humanity (249). With this equation he had conceived the central ideal of his system and his practical philosophy: humanity the final cause of the individual's life; this life to be socialized, that is, to be lived in complete devotion to humanity.

This constructive reasoning of his thirties Franklin has called his third conversion—his second conversion had invaded consciousness at eighteen in the form of a moonlight illumination that told him he was then free from the orthodox conception of the fall of man, the atonement and hell. The happiness resulting from the third conversion is said to have been much more intense than that accompanying the first two. This statement agrees very well with the positive beliefs gained by the third which are so necessary to a healthy life; his manhood reasoning had then been completed in a way satisfactory to the individual.

The method, however, employed in it still bears the marks of the antithetical effect upon his reasoning of the metaphysical struggle of his youth. He reasons thus: the hideousness of modern civilization with its poverty, its struggle for existence, its wars, is due to the inefficiency of Christianity (177). The religion of the church is chiefly superstition, fanaticism, bigotry, hypocrisy (333). Christianity does not recognize that governments may do wrong (361). Society, owing to its traditional theology, makes no effort to remedy the social tragedies (367). The thought-stopping answers of theology have stultified man in his investigations (261). Religion is taken advantage of by designing individuals (127). Hypocrisy is the philosophy of the leaders of men to-day as it has been in all past ages in transitional periods, as from mythology to theology (144). The race has ever been the victim of its great individuals, nobilities, priesthoods, professions (151). It is the avowed object of college training to hold persons in their childhood beliefs instead of making them original thinkers (183). Every revolutionizing genius and scientist has suffered as the martyr of his cause (168). And last, not least, Christianity does not fit the individual's acute intellect

(338). In short, the Christian church stands for a theory of things which considers man to be a slave to an imaginary God and his vicegerents and minions here on earth, and existence to be a fixed condition of servitude, instead of a glorious career of development. It is either Rome or reason, as Cardinal Newman said (194). The author has chosen reason; for him science, the work of man's reason, has taken the place of our effete theology.

Reason apparently denotes with Franklin something that will assist in realizing the ideals the youth dreamed of, the betterment of the race. Reason, highly appreciated in the matter-of-fact attitude of manhood, leads to a rational or scientific conception of the universe and permits of conceiving a rational system of living (6). This scientific knowledge begins with matter and energy, and ends by describing all nature in their terms. While the scientist of today will be glad to reduce all knowledge to mathematical equations, Mr. Franklin seems to hold the fond hope of the eighteenth century that it will be possible to mechanize science; his enthusiasm, not sobered by either epistemology or even an amateur philosopher like Du-Bois-Reymond, carries him away to the assertion that even the ultimate secrets of the universe are within the limits of our investigation (7); life will not be a mystery but a science (256).

Empedocles would have satisfied his demand for light on the process of knowing by his answer: *γαίηι μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὀπώπαμεν* (we know the like by the like). Knowing meant to the Greek thinker (if I understand it at all) nothing less than to know as much of a thing as you may know of yourself by introspection; his way and his theory of knowing had not yet outgrown the anthropomorphizing attitude of primitive man. The same method of knowing is used by Mr. Franklin when he rises against the scientists who do not admit that the internal vibrations registered in the nervous system of animals are identical with the external vibrations of the environment. From his point of view they must be identical or else we would have unlike knowing like for the first time in all nature (44). If the mind is not the residual representations of external energies so as to be identical with it, then it is inexplicable, then the universe is unknowable, then science is but a dream, and man the sorry dupe of his own nature. Such is not the case (46). He is certainly not a pragmatist; he is an enthusiastic rationalist; he will not submit to the relativity of human knowledge, but believes in our ability to arrive at absolute knowledge; and since he unknowingly reasons from the analogy of his own inner aspect to the life of the things about him, he insists on knowing the like by the like as the only method that satisfies 'his longings for absolute knowledge' (80).

On the other hand, Mr. Franklin has given up in despair the

task of forming a concept of a purposeful universe out of the apparent chaos and realizes that man is a being unfriended by the Infinite (4); his teleological vision lacking in intensity, he has resigned himself to that knowledge that describes nature in terms of matter and energy. But since these external phenomena are silently understood to have an inner aspect according to the above principle of knowing the like by the like, the thinker may easily take mechanical energies to be identical with mind as their residua in the brain; nor is the inference to be wondered at that we shall finally know what we are and what everything else is in terms of our own being (256); then we shall also know what matter is because we know what emotions and ideas are (85); thus the gap between mind and matter is spanned, and the whence, whither and why of humanity determined (129).

The hidden anthropomorphism comes out more clearly in his chapter on 'Aspects of Scientific Morality,' where the various forms of the will are given as chemical affinity, appetite, desire, will, love, religion (348). Mr. Franklin illustrates his way of reasoning by referring to Bacon's 'Advancement of Learning.'[3] However, we need not go back into the past. This anthropomorphic stage of scientific reasoning with its belief in absolute knowledge and its inability to perceive the outer as well as the inner aspect of this world as psychic realities may still be studied in life. Professor E. Haeckel, of Jena, regarded in 1892[4] all matter as endowed with feeling and the power of motion, and, as a true rationalist demanding an explanation of chemical affinity, accepted the Empedoclean supposition that the molecules or atoms feel each other. To-day his hylonism, or hylozoism, is, according to 'The Wonders of Life,' meant to express 'the fact that all substance has two fundamental attributes; as matter it occupies space, and as force or energy it is endowed with sensation.' In the same way, Professor W. von Bechterev[5] needs for his scientific reasoning a psyche (innere Verarbeitung äusserer Rückwirkungen) as the inner aspect of the most simple living beings, but he more cautiously arrests his anthropomorphizing bent where the series of living substances ends. Neither do I think that Herbert Spencer in making the equation, ether = consciousness, passed beyond this hylozoism; and Diogenes, of Apollonia, generalizing primitive thought, for instance, that of the ancient Hebrew, endowed all the air with an inner aspect.

However, before we go on with the analysis of the philosopher in hand, we must state here in justice to him that quitting the common

[3] Book IV., Chap. 3.

[4] *Monist*, III., p. 234.

[5] *Journal für Psychologie u. Neurologie*, V., p. 211.

school when still a boy of eleven, he has not had the opportunity for, and guidance in, developing so rich a system of concepts as one who attends school until he enters upon a profession at about twenty-five. Thus there was a limited range of concepts and a limited capacity for receiving new ones at his disposal while he was constructing a vast metaphysical system. This limitation of intellectual content accounts for the fact that our rationalist is, on the one hand, so easily satisfied with anthropomorphic ways of reasoning, though determined on a rigorous mechanization of all science, and, on the other hand, manifests a certain unwillingness to stand the 'showers of scientific technicalities' and an inability to understand the intricacies of modern science. For instance, he thinks that the various definitions of society proposed by sociologists are due to a capricious desire to be original rather than to express the facts in the case (373). It is no wonder that at the age of eighteen he was at first not able to understand Mallock's 'Is Life Worth Living?' and that he read Comte's 'Positive Philosophy' in Martineau's abbreviation 'many times' since his twenty-second year before he understood his 'greatest philosopher.'

With such mental make-up, holding fast to the true rationalist method that he had followed since his boyhood days, he looked out upon the universe. In the eyes of the anthropomorphizing thinker, the universe is a being the only business of which is to economically expend energy, and, like a householder or economist, he assumes the utilitarian attitude of mind, asking 'what for?' and 'to whose benefit?' The answer is not favorable to that being, because the conception of an economical expenditure of energy does very well when applied to living beings that succeed best in preserving life by greatest economy along with the vigorous play of their biological functions, but can never be deduced from the life of a universe which as a whole is not accessible to scientific analysis. Nature is the most wasteful organization (12). Its seemingly intelligent arrangement does not amount to much when we estimate all of the waste. If man had the power, he could make improvements in the solar system, arrange to better advantage the rainfall upon the earth and economize the sunlight. Man might plan such wonderful things because the energies of nature in their fortuitous combinations have resulted in a new world, the life of the individual controlled by the conscious or subconscious mind; the test for this mind is order resulting from an ever more economical expenditure of energy that goes to preserve the individual and the race (96). Thus, according to Mr. Franklin, purposive mind appears a stranger in a strange world which has no purpose. Only in a few places we may come across a larger vision that recalls Hegel (whom the author never felt inclined to study);

for instance, where Franklin sums up the universal process by saying that the individual comprises within himself all of nature and all of society by being the object in which nature returns upon itself in self-consciousness (161).

In general, however, and consistent with the whole system, the narrower vision prevails. A part of the universe has been surrendered as inaccessible to the purposive interpretation of the ideal will or teleological vision. The remainder is not, as one should infer from his biological test for mind consisting in economical expenditure of energy, the whole animate world, to which modern scientists, in contrast with eighteenth-century rationalism, feel inclined to extend the fellowship of kin; the remainder is humanity only, that part of the animate world which is capable of planning a greater perfection of its life and conceiving of the socialization of humanity as its final cause and chief concern. Since Mr. Franklin has learned to his joy that society is the author and perfecter of our being, he demands that all prayers, all songs, all praises, all service, be inspired by humanity and directed to humanity (270), 'in which we live and move and have our being.'

Thus religion is the very climax of mental life, because it is the emotion of race-protection (95), because the most exquisite ecstasy possible to a human being comes from the performance of his social functions (155). Without religion no socialization! Only the supreme ecstasy of religion will overcome selfish individualism, the immediate cause of all social misery (251). Therefore one should make religion the basis in our system of education (105), so that no scholar may leave school without the vision of humanity. On this basis, the educator is to consciously and consistently build up his educational practice after the demands of biology and sociology. He should teach what nature is and how to live in it, what society is and how to adjust one's self to it; he should teach these subjects, even sociology, by the experimental methods (181).

After this practical philosophy had been worked out, or at least conceived in its main features, Mr. Franklin seems to have felt the need of unifying his ideas about life into one homogeneous system, or, as he says, 'to interpret everything in the terms of some one thing.' When at the age of twenty-two he decided to construct his own system of philosophy it was with him a matter-of-course that he reject the conception of God as unsuited to guide to ultimate terms, because the inner aspect was, for lack of vision, not the predominant factor of his experience. As we saw above, he accepted as suited for the purpose the terms of the space or outer aspect. He found it easier to arrive at an ultimate substance and an ultimate law than his master. Comte, too well informed to believe in the

mechanization of science, yet gifted with too narrow a vision to look at ultimate questions from the psychical point of view—Comte in the 'Introduction' holds out no hope that he might be able to reduce the vast variety of experience as proceeding from a single principle and as subjected to a single law.

Mr. Franklin then began, quite up to date, with energy as the ultimate concept, as if he were familiar with Ostwald's speculations on matter and followed him in not seeing the heterogeneity and reciprocity of matter and energy, that is, that neither term can do without the other nor take the place of the other. Energy, we are further told, manifests itself as gravitant and radiant. Gravitant energy produces the forms of matter, radiant energy the conditions of matter. The latter is 'expended' (1) by inanimate nature, (2) by the self-interested individual under the direction of the intellect (fourth law of motion), (3) by the same under the guidance of the emotional 'moral sense' (fifth law of motion), and (4) by the same according to the 'social sense' or scientific knowledge (sixth law of motion); each form more and more approaching the perfectly economical method of the last. Gravitant or internal energy manifests itself (1) in nature as chemical affinity, (2) as the instinct of self-preservation in the animate world, (3) as sexual love in man, and (4) as religion, holding men together in a social organization. From the fact that both kinds of energy behave everywhere and at all times in the same way, the author deduced and discovered, after seventeen years of thought, the law of external and internal repetition as the ultimate law. It seems to mean that there are uniformities of nature; nature follows up the same causes with the same effects: Mr. Franklin wants to have here subsumed Tarde's and Baldwin's laws of imitation. Only the varied combination of the two kinds of energy produce change, evolution and progress.

So much for the general character and growth of this 'monistic system of philosophy,' which is as much a monism as Professor Haeckel's or any other hylozoism.

If I were finally asked to give an opinion on the practical educative value of the work that embodies the system, I should point out these three of its features. First, it is all through a passionate plea for the ever more thorough application of science to the functions of individual and social life: let us eat and drink scientifically, let us work and rest scientifically, let us engender offspring scientifically, let us organize society scientifically. What the author means may, in part, I think, be well illustrated by the exceedingly scientific conduct of the Japanese commissariat and medical service during the late war. I wish, indeed, some academy of sciences would compile a moral code, something parallel to the civil code of the courts; a

code which prescribes rules of conduct regarding the various functions of the individual and society; which could be revised at stated intervals like the official dictionary of the French Academy; a code which would infinitely assist the anxious inquirer to live a healthier, more useful and happier life and thus prevent many evils arising from the ignorance of those who are willing to do better.

Second, the book forces upon us the conclusion that the very application of science to the problems of social life will contribute to tighten the social fabric in order to preserve and increase the life of the social body and the individuals composing it. Mr. Franklin is not a socialist of this or that brand; well, he is as much of a socialist as we all are who want to consciously and scientifically guide the evolution of society to forms of organization in which the individual reaches his highest development and is thereby enabled to serve society in the most efficient way. Mr. Franklin, though better appreciating the function of society than Herbert Spencer, is still at heart an Anglo-Saxon individualist, he is not kin to the German socialist, because with Franklin the socialization of humanity is not an end in itself, but a means to create conditions favorable to perfect the life of the individual. The German socialist represents a racial admixture to the Teuton stock which is not made for an individualistic society; his vision of the state is not so differentiated as to include the most intense individualization as a means of increasing the life of the body politic.

And third, education ought to be more rigorously planned and practiced from the biological point of view of efficiency to preserve and increase life; and since skill is developed and efficiency attained by practice or experiment only, Mr. Franklin wants to have the laboratory methods extended even to the subject of sociology. I suppose he has in mind something like the 'school city' political organizations of high school pupils tried successfully in several larger cities of the east and middle west and resorted to already by the great educators and character-builders of eighteenth-century rationalism.

This is his sermon, and I am sure a large and congenial congregation is ready to listen to its preacher.

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DISCUSSION

A REPLY TO DR. MINER

MY recent review of the *Iowa Studies in Psychology* has called forth a rejoinder from Dr. Miner. It will be remembered that Dr. Miner's paper in the *Studies* sought, in part, to determine whether 'the loss of sight in a blind person is compensated for by greater keenness in the other senses.' Such an investigation could, of course, be accomplished only by first making an accurate and thorough determination of the (congenitally blind) patient's sensitivity in the various sense departments, and then comparing these results with data similarly obtained from normal subjects. My review pointed out in detail that Dr. Miner's work failed to meet either of these requirements.

The author now replies that his paper is entitled to favorable consideration because the condition of his patient's health prevented 'long-continued experiments,' and because the publication professed to be nothing more than a preliminary report. Dr. Miner seemed to be favored with an unusual opportunity to contribute to the solution of a much-disputed problem. And every psychologist must regret that the complete accomplishment of his purpose was prevented by circumstances over which he had no control. Yet the fact remains that half a loaf is better than no bread. Under the peculiar circumstances of the case, Dr. Miner found himself confronted by two alternatives; either he might make a superficial examination of the whole field, or he might confine his efforts to a thorough investigation of a circumscribed part of the problem. And our criticism would have been forestalled if he had chosen the latter alternative.

It is not clear to me why the fact that a paper is a preliminary report should absolve it from criticism. One is under no compulsion to publish a half-finished product; and the utility of immature publication may well be called in question, particularly in these days of strenuously active production. No doubt there may, in certain cases, be adequate reasons for such a preliminary report. Dr. Miner assures us that his was published in the hope of obtaining suggestions for further work. But—has he forgotten his patient's feeble health? One can not eat one's cake and have it too. Was the patient available for additional experiments, or was she not? If she was, then the excuse given for lack of thoroughness of experimentation is unjustified. If she was not, then the reason assigned for premature publication is idle.

Dr. Miner charges my review with a twofold omission, and with various 'misrepresentations.' As for the omission, it is to be borne in

mind that a review is, in the nature of the case, a brief summary and criticism of a more lengthy publication. Certain omissions must be made; and there may be room for difference of opinion as to what points are to be included and what omitted. A single omission, even if it be twofold as in the present instance, is not of necessity an unpardonable sin. Moreover, if Dr. Miner will look again he will find that his report of an abnormal color sensitivity which I am charged with 'completely overlooking' is not omitted from the review.

I am said to 'misrepresent' the condition of his patient in that I referred to her disorder as 'a cataract.' The affection was not confined to a single eye, and hence I should have said 'cataracts.' But if Dr. Miner will consult the literature he will find that I have abundant authority for the form of expression which I employed. Would he maintain that Ware, Franz and other writers of equal prominence have persistently 'misrepresented' the condition of their patients?

Exception is taken to my criticism that the author dismisses the problem of passive touch with a single short sentence. It is explained that the pith-ball test revealed 'no peculiar sensitivity,' and that 'time was too precious to waste on unnecessary tests.' Truly! But why select the uncertain pith-ball test, rather than employ the much more accurate and much more refined esthesiometer of von Frey? It seemed to the reviewer to be an essential part of the investigation to determine accurately whether the patient's training in the school for the blind had refined the sensitivity of her finger-tips. Hence my criticism of Dr. Miner's treatment of passive touch and of dual impression.

It is further charged that I described the test of active touch as unmeaning, and that my criticism is based upon my misrepresentation of the experiment. Here, again, Dr. Miner is in error; for if he will reread the review he will find that I passed no criticism whatever upon this test, and that I neither misrepresented his experiment nor described it as unmeaning. What I did criticize was *the form in which he expressed his results.* These are not presented in relative terms. And since no normal records are given for comparison, the reader is wholly at a loss to know whether the author's statement means that his patient's sensitivity to active touch was normal, was abnormally acute, or was abnormally obtuse. Hence my criticism: "The stimulus limen of active touch is expressed in terms of the number of sheets of paper through which a fine wire could be felt,—a statement which is unmeaning as it stands, and no normal records are presented for comparison."

Dr. Miner and I are widely at variance as to what constitute the essential features in an investigation of depth perception. He

describes his sole experiment as follows: "Different sized balls were hung at varying distances from her. Using only one eye, she judged them to be at the same distance when one was 15 cm. farther away. But the difference was narrowed down to 6 cm. when both eyes were converged on one ball and then on the other. Her error was thus cut in half by using both eyes together." The description of the conditions under which this determination was made is, as will be seen, exceedingly meager. It seems probable, however, that the experimenter was attempting to test the influence of the primary criteria upon his patient's estimation of distance. Now, it is agreed by all investigators of the visual perception of distance that the primary criteria—whether they be conceived in terms of muscular sensations, or of purely retinal data—*are effective in proportion as the visual object is near the eye.* It is clear then that Dr. Miner's statement is defective in that no mention is made of the distance from the eye at which his test was made. Moreover, in any investigation of the influence of the primary criteria, it is essential that secondary criteria be excluded. Dr. Miner's experiment, as described in his paper, did not provide for the exclusion of change of visual angle nor of other secondary clues to distance. The reviewer noted this defect and suggested that an adequate statement of the conditions would have specified the diameters of 'the different sized balls.' Dr. Miner assures us that the absolute distances and the varying sizes of the balls 'have little bearing upon the characteristic demonstrated, namely, the change in her accuracy.' The reviewer is unable to share this disdain of established facts.

In reporting his tests of tonal discrimination, the author brings forward but a single set of numerical results. "With the tuning forks she distinguished, nine times out of ten, a difference of eight vibrations from the international á (435 vibrations)." Since, here again, no data for normal subjects are presented, the reviewer was obliged to turn to the literature for comparative results. It has been established that the normal difference limen for this region of the tonal scale is, after preliminary practice, considerably less than one vibration. Inasmuch, then, as Dr. Miner found that his patient's difference limen was some twentyfold greater than that of the normal subject, and yet in the face of this fact concluded that she possessed a normal sensitivity, the reviewer ventured to suggest that there seemed to be a discrepancy between the author's premise and his conclusion. Dr. Miner replies by introducing new data which he has obtained from normal subjects, and which he finds to bear witness to the normality of his patient. Why were these data not included in the original paper, to which they properly belong? It is just this failure

to present comparative results which has been a chief factor in rendering the publication abortive. Moreover, the fact that the author's determinations of the normal difference limen for tones are twentyfold greater than the normal determinations of the most reliable workers in the field of psychological acoustics shows that there is something radically wrong with Dr. Miner's conditions of practice or of experimentation.

I believe that I have met all of the objections raised against my review. It is unnecessary to add that I stand by my original criticism. Dr. Miner seems to me to have been guilty of an error of judgment in the planning and conduct of his whole investigation. I am convinced, too, that he merits criticism for the imperfect character of his presentation. Whether I am right or wrong in these contentions I can only leave to the competent to decide.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

The Philosophy of F. H. Jacobi. ALEXANDER W. CRAWFORD. *Cornell Studies in Philosophy,* No. 6. The Macmillan Co. 1905. Pp. iii + 90.

A new presentation of this philosophy of realism, immediacy, experience and faith is certainly welcome in view of the prominence of these catchwords in contemporary discussion. Not that Jacobi throws any new light upon our controversies, for his thought is ill-defined, but it is interesting to note the form which the reaction against rationalism and sensationalism assumed in his writings. His personality, also, has much in it that is akin to some of the modern leaders of the new thought.

Professor Crawford's monograph is the result of an exhaustive study of his subject and his quotations and references give ample material for the reconstruction of Jacobi's system. His work appears to be a labor of love, and where he errs it is largely due to his desire to give his subject the benefit of the most liberal interpretation possible. This is, indeed, to a certain extent justifiable in the case of men of the Platonic temperament whose contribution is an attitude rather than a system, yet when done it should be done explicitly and clearly. There seems to be, also, a certain looseness in the use of such fundamental terms as realism, idealism and immediate, which makes the author's interpretations misleading. The term realism, especially, seems to irritate him as applied to Jacobi's philosophy because it suggests to him a materialistic interpretation of reality, its colorless epistemological meaning, which is that emphasized by Jacobi himself, being but grudgingly recognized. Certain inconsistencies of statement naturally result from these ambi-

guities but, taken as a whole, the book gives an extremely readable and complete account of this faith philosophy.

Jacobi's starting-point was the primacy of the heart over the head, and his whole philosophy was an attempt to interpret the world in such fashion as would validate life's practical ideals. The particular form of his doctrine was determined by his opposition to the prevailing rationalism of his day, the logical outcome of which he believed to be a Spinozistic pantheism incompatible with individual personality. As against such a conceptual system Jacobi stood for the primacy of life and experience as alone furnishing the reality which must be the correlate and standard of our thinking. But in this experience he discovered other elements than those furnished by sensation. Certain spiritual realities are presented immediately in feeling or reason which have as great a certitude as those of sense. God, as well as the world, is present in our lives, and of His reality we need, and can have, no other proof than that we find Him there. Sense and feeling are thus the coordinate sources of the data upon which all our thinking rests.

It is in the interpretation of the nature of this immediate spiritual intuition that our author's position seems doubtful. Criticizing the present reviewer's assertion that in the act of perception Jacobi makes the mind passive toward its object and that his whole doctrine of knowledge is really an attempt to rid knowledge of the thought element in it, Professor Crawford says, "This would be true only of Jacobi's earlier expositions of perception, when he called it a form of feeling, but it is the contention of this study that his later adoption of the word 'reason' in place of 'feeling' is a recognition, or a restoration, of the thought element in reason or judgment" (p. 47). It might be enough to place alongside of this passage the following: "The real, then, is given in perception rather than in thought or in ratiocination. Perception is real because it gives both thought and being. . . . Conception can not give objectivity; this is found only in perception, where alone actuality is given. In the same way reason (faith), as a form of perception, creates no concepts, builds no system, passes no judgments, but, like the external sense, merely reveals and positively makes known" (p. 59). Jacobi's whole philosophy is built upon this contrast between mediacy and immediacy, between that knowledge which is the result of reflection and subject to proof, and that which is given and not susceptible to proof. That the receptivity of the mind may itself be viewed as a kind of activity does not affect his position that the objects of faith are not known through a process, or that perception and thought are distinct. That such a conception of pure immediacy is not capable of being consistently carried out is no ground for denying that it was actually held. This the author appears to recognize when he says, "If Jacobi's view of immediacy were possible at all, it would render *self*-consciousness impossible. . . . All this Jacobi felt in a way; and only in so far as he got beyond the standpoint of immediacy did he formulate a philosophy at all." Which is only to say that he failed to hold fast to what was his real principle.

The author's discussion of Jacobi's realism is even more uncertain in tenor. He is uneasy at the idea of classing him as a realist and yet is forced to do so, formally at least. His trouble lies in his failure to understand what this realism means in this connection. Jacobi believed that our experience is not a mere train of subjective mental states, sensations and ideas, but that real objects are given us immediately and are the objects to which out thought refers. "In the first and simplest perception there must be the 'I' and the 'thou,' inner consciousness and external object existing together in the soul: both in the same indivisible moment, without before or after, without any operation of the understanding, nay, even without in the slightest degree beginning the production of the concept of cause and effect" (p. 57). Real objects, not ideas, are thus the primary data of knowledge and, though independent of us, given in our experience. They are revealed to us as things beyond us, yet within us. Their being known by us adds nothing to their reality, which is the condition of our accidental knowing of them. And this reality which objects have is not a mere phenomenal reality, such as Kant ascribed to the objects of knowledge, but is a complete noumenal reality, so that our author's assertion that Jacobi is no 'more of a realist than Kant' is hard to understand. It is quite true that the most important, if not ultimately all, realities are for Jacobi of a spiritual nature, subjects rather than substances, yet this is obviously beside the question of the relation of our knowledge to its object. With his insistence upon the ultimate significance of the individual person and the impossibility of turning faith into knowledge, Jacobi would have been the last to accept the monism of the Hegelian idealism. Such a monism was for him always the type of a rational philosophy, but, as such, always the proof that a rational philosophy was inadequate as a formulation of reality. As an upholder of the doctrine of the primacy and independence of spiritual reals, Jacobi must be looked upon as the founder of the realistic opposition to that line of idealists of whom Kant was the first.

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Mathematical Emancipations. C. J. KEYSER. *Monist,* January, 1906. Pp. 65–83.

The clear and elementary account of the concept of dimensionality which Professor Keyser has given us under the above somewhat mystifying title is especially welcome, inasmuch as writers in our philosophic journals are wont to drag Kantianism into the discussion and so confuse the issue. We regret, however, to find the paper confined, for the most part, to the exposition of mathematical facts, ignoring the work of Poincaré,[1] who has presented essentially the same material and interpreted it with great philosophic insight.

The creation of manifolds by the act of discrimination, says Professor Keyser, is the most primitive manifestation of mind. The dimension-

[1] Cf. especially 'Science et Hypothèse,' Part 2. Paris, 1902.

ality of a manifold, mathematical or otherwise, depends upon the number of independent facts which must be known to distinguish any element of it from all the other elements. But the dimensionality depends in part upon the will of the investigator; the plane is two-dimensional in terms of either points or lines, but if treated as a collection of circles, as is perfectly permissible, it is three-dimensional, since two independent data are required for position and one for size in the case of each element. It is four-dimensional in parabolas, five-dimensional in conics, etc., 'without limit' (p. 75). We can in like manner analyze any configurations of space in many different ways. The mystery of hyperdimensionality vanishes in the simplicity of these considerations, and we see that our preference for the point among possible elements is to be explained through the fact that 'practical man precedes man rational and determines for the latter his rational choices' (p. 77).[2]

Dimensionalities exceeding three in *points* have a special interest. Such manifolds are created in thought and have genuine conceptual existence (p. 80). Just as we can posit the point manifold which we call a plane, and a point outside of it which we connect by lines with every point of the plane, and so generate a three-dimensional manifold in points, we can also posit a point outside of this manifold and connect it similarly with every point already given, thus obtaining a four-dimensional manifold in points. But, "Is it possible to intuit configurations in a hyperspace of points?" (p. 81). While admitting inability to answer with absolute confidence, Professor Keyser thinks that with practise and acquired skill "the *parts* of a familiar *fourfold configuration* may be made to pass before the eye of intuition in such *swift* and *effortless* succession that the configuration *seems present as a whole in a single instant.* If the *process* and *result* are not, properly speaking, *fourfold imagination and fourfold image,* it remains for the psychologist to indicate what is lacking" (p. 82).

A more satisfactory treatment of this problem could have been derived from the study of Poincaré,[3] or even from taking Russell's[4] account of geometry to heart. The geometry with which Professor Keyser deals is pure geometry not yet applied in our world of experience. In pure geometry, the problem of intuiting a space is the problem of holding a complex of logical relations before the mind, and it is certain we can not do this for complex configurations of three- or even two-dimensional point manifolds. In applied geometry, on the other hand, to intuit space as four dimensional would mean to have our experience different from what it is; thus, if the feelings of convergence and accommodation of the eyes, as factors in our perception of depth, varied independently, visual space would be a four-dimensional point manifold; yet while we can state the condition, we can have no idea what the new experience would be like, and so there is no possibility of intuiting our space as four-dimensional

[2] Cf. Poincaré, *op. cit.*, pp. 67, 91.

[3] *Loc. Cit.*

[4] 'Principles of Mathematics,' Ch. LXIV. Cambridge, 1903.

in this sense. The paper closes with the usual vindication of the study of 'hypergeometries' through esthetic joy in reasoning.

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Rôle des sensations internes dans les émotions et dans la perception de la durée. G. R. D'ALLONES. *Revue Philosophique,* December, 1905. Pp. 592–623.

The case is here reported of a woman, fifty-three years of age, uneducated but intelligent, and without any discoverable hereditary taint, who from being naturally of a highly emotional disposition had come, in consequence of sickness and various depleting conditions, to feel, apparently, no emotions at all. The interesting feature of the case is that at the very moment when she declares that she does not feel a certain emotion, she nevertheless shows all the signs of it in their normal intensity. The suspicion, however, that we are dealing here with a 'psychasthenic,' or with the victim of a fixed idea, is not well grounded; there is good reason to believe that her statements about her feelings are true. The author has examined the patient with reference to her sensibility and finds that, while there are no defects such as to cause an appreciable modification of external perception and little perturbation of the motor functions, visceral sensibility is practically abolished and organic sensibility generally profoundly affected. Thus, while tactile sensibility is only lowered, there is complete anesthesia to heat and pain over almost the entire surface of the body. The gustatory sensations are defective; the patient never feels hunger or satiety, thirst rarely, fatigue hardly at all and never the benefit of repose; a sensation serves as a signal when the bladder or rectum is full, but without distress, and the discharge of the function is never attended with the feeling of relief; purgatives cause no colic and no increased sense of need, etc. Castor oil produces nausea, but no feeling of disgust. On one important point the evidence seems defective, namely, as to the sensations accompanying respiration and circulation; but we are assured by the author (p. 614) that the internal reflexes are totally unconscious.

The main inference drawn from these facts coincides with the result previously reached by Sollier,[1] that the essential thing in emotion is the visceral sensibility, and that sensations from 'movements of relation' are only accessory. The author, however, writes from the point of view of the peripheral theory, which Sollier, with his 'cerebral' interpretation of the facts, discards. Whatever the interpretation, the intimate and essential connection of visceral and emotional susceptibility seems to be one of the most certain results of investigation in this field.

Another inference is that we have to distinguish among organic sensations the affective, *i. e.,* visceral and cutaneous painful and thermal, and the non-affective, *i. e.,* sensorial, tactile and external motor.

A further, and important, inference is that we must distinguish emo-

[1] 'Mécanisme des Emotions,' pp. 178 ff.

tions and inclinations. The patient is still capable of 'intellectual' inclinations, she 'fears' without suffering, 'desires' without pleasure or distress. Such inclinations are explained as the residua of previous emotions devoid of their affective nucleus, the internal sensations. They are constituted, it is held, of sensations of external movements, special sense data, memories, ideas, judgments, reasonings, the whole capable of cohesion and systematization and of being externalized, without emotion, in words, mimic movements and acts.

A further peculiarity of the patient is that she has no sense of the lapse of time. This the author also connects with the loss of visceral sensibility, and concludes that the living sense of duration, of the continuity in succession of the daily events, is nothing but visceral sensibility. But as the patient is able at times to distinguish difference in rate of two compared series of beats,—though hardly after the first few strokes, unless the difference is very marked,—he distinguishes visceral duration, which extends only to some few hours, from infinite intellectual time, on the one hand, and from sensori-motor time, which does not extend beyond a few seconds, on the other.

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SMITH COLLEGE.

Erzeugung kurzdauernder Lichtreize mit Hilfe des Projektionsapparats. KARL MARBE. *Archiv für die gesammte Physiologie,* Bd. 107, 1905. S. 585.

The author describes an interesting and relatively inexpensive apparatus for giving simultaneous and successive visual stimuli, that admits of a wide range of variation. The main features are a projection apparatus, a rotating disk with motor, a screen with a small window that is opened and closed by an electrical release, and a revolution-counter with electric contacts. This apparatus without the projection lantern or the motor that propels the disk can be had of a Würzburg manufacturer for M. 85. Among the possibilities of this apparatus are the production of a 'Talbot field,' in which the intensity and duration of the light phase and the duration of the dark phase can be very widely varied, and beside it a periodically illuminated field of varying duration and intensity; of two Talbot fields in which a considerable range of conditions may be specified; of a single field in which the duration and intensity of illumination can be varied to almost any extent, etc. The apparatus should be useful in a wide variety of psychological experiments, and it is equally adapted for demonstration work.

E. B. HOLT.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

ARCHIV FÜR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE. October, 1905, Band 12, Heft 1. *Mechanismus und Teleologie in der Philosophie Lotzes* (pp. 1–98): K. WEIDEL. – That events occur according to universal laws is not learned from experience, says Lotze, but is a presupposition based on the law of identity itself. Organisms are strictly mechanical, and their germs contain no multiplicity of detail to account for future development. The human soul, however, is genuinely active, both in the physical and in the psychical realms, though in accordance with universal laws. The mechanical view of the world requires as a starting-point a definite systematic character, not an accidental or chaotic condition, so that it presumes purpose. Hence it itself points to a rational order, to a systematic unity and to a living absolute. The personality of God, however, is not demonstrable, and the union of mechanism with the moral and esthetic character of the world is a perpetual riddle. The freedom of the will is a fact similar to the original creation of things. What the will originates is, like all else, connected as to its parts under universal laws. Dr. Weidel objects particularly that Lotze contradicts himself in assuming 'soul-substance' and 'will-origination.' The only solution of the relation of mechanism and teleology is through the theory of energy. *Kants Antinomien und Zenons Beweise gegen die Bewegung* (pp. 99–122): R. SALINGER. – The chief problems of Zeno reappear in Kant's antinomies, and the solution of them still waits on the definition of continuity. *Die polnische Philosophie der letzten zehn Jahre, 1894–1904* (pp. 125–147): H. VON STRUVE. – No one philosopher is singled out for special attention. *Die neuesten Erscheinungen. Eingegangene Bücher. Zeitschriften.*

MIND. October, 1905, N. S., No. 56. *Pragmatism vs. Absolutism* (II.) (pp. 441–478): R. F. ALFRED HOERNLÉ. – The central doctrine of pragmatism is the insistence on the purposiveness of our whole mental life. As absolutism errs in separating truth from our acceptance of it, so pragmatism errs in making the latter our sole criterion of truth. The conception of an *Arbeitswelt,* or common life, of which all human activities, theoretical or practical, are but forms, does justice to pragmatism and at the same time corrects its failure to find a unifying element, or whole, to which all manifestations of purpose contribute. *On Denoting* (pp. 479–493): BERTRAND RUSSELL. – The exposition of a confessedly complicated theory by which the author would solve what he regards as the puzzles involved in propositions in which the subject is a nonentity. *Predetermination and Personal Endeavor* (pp. 494–506): W. R. BOYCE GIBSON. – If knowledge means simply knowledge of objects, it stands in direct antithesis to volition; but if knowledge includes knowledge of a developing subject or self, the gulf between will and intellect is bridged. *Is Humanism a Philosophical Advance?* (pp. 507–529): S. H. MELLONE. – "Does humanism in effect explain away intellect into emotion and will?

Does humanism in effect deny to the object any independence of the subject's will and action on it?" The author shows very convincingly that these difficulties have not been adequately or even frankly dealt with by James and Schiller, and he tells us that "until they have been fully dealt with, humanism leaves us with the same ambiguities on our hands as did the absolute idealism which it claims to replace." *Critical Notices:* A. Meinong, *Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie:* B. RUSSELL. G. Simmel, *Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie: eine erkenntnistheoretische studie:* D. MORRISON. E. Spranger, *Die Grundlagen der Geschichtswissenschaft: eine erkenntnistheoretisch-psychologische Untersuchung:* D. MORRISON. J. Petzoldt, *Einführung in die Philosophie der reinen Erfahrung:* J. L. M'INTYRE. *New Books. Philosophical Periodicals. Notes: Lewis Carroll's Logical Paradox* (E. E. C. JONES). *The Existential Import of Logical Propositions* (H. MACCOLL).

Heymans, G. *Die Gesetze und Elemente des Wissenschaftlichen Denkens.* Zweite verbesserte auflage. Leipzig: Barth. 1905. Pp. x + 421.

Leroy, Eugene-Bernard. *Le langage: Essai sur la psychologie normale et pathologique de cette fonction.* Paris: Felix Alcan. 1905. Pp. 293. 5 fr.

Lotsy, J. P. *Vorlesungen über Deszendenztheorie, Erster Theil.* Jena: Gustav Fischer. 1906. Pp. xii + 384.

Morgan, C. Lloyd. *The Interpretation of Nature.* London: The Macmillan Co. 1905.

Oman, J. Campbell. *The Mystics, Ascetics and Saints of India.* London: T. Fischer Unwin. 1905.

Pauly, August. *Darwinismus und Lamarckismus. Entwurf einer psychophysischen Teleologie.* Munich: Ernst Reinhardt. 1905. Pp. 335.

Raeder, Hans. *Platon's Philosophische Entwickelung.* Leipzig: Teubner. 1905. Pp. 435.

Small, Albion W. *General Sociology: An Exposition of the Main Development of Sociological Theory from Spencer to Ratzenhofer.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1905. Pp. xiii + 739.

Wasa, Rafael Karstein. *The Origin of Worship.* A Study in Primitive Religion. Press of F. Unggren. 1905. Pp. 142.

NOTES AND NEWS

THE following is from *Nature* for January 11: "In the *Biologisches Centralblatt* (December 15, 1905) Professor Gorjanović-Kramberger discusses the relationships of the race of men whose remains have recently been discovered at Krapina, south of the Styrian frontier. From the examination of these remains it appears that the Krapina race is identical with the one from Neanderthal, Spy, La Naulette, Schipka, etc., for which the name *Homo primigenius* has been proposed. From this primitive

type there seems to be a complete transition in cranial characters, through the upper diluvial *H. sapiens fossilis,* to modern man, who occasionally exhibits some of the peculiarities of the ancestral form, such as the absence of the chin prominence and the presence of wrinkles in the enamel of the molars. The prediluvial race of Galley (? Gallows) Hill, England, presents a difficulty, since, although this is the oldest, it is at the same time the most modern type. This is explained by the theory of the existence at this early date of two distinct types of mankind, namely, *Homo sapiens fossilis* at Galley (?) Hill, which had attained a relatively high development, and *H. primigenius* at Krapina, Neanderthal, etc., the advance of which may have been prevented by unfavorable conditions of existence."

In the same number of *Nature* Mr. Charles E. Benham, of Colchester, points out that the theories of Rumford and Young to account for the phenomena of light and heat are anticipated by some sixty years in the 'Principia' of Swedenborg, published in 1733. Part III., chapter VIII., of the 'Principia' contains the following: "Whatever the ether presents to our organs by means of colours, the air presents to us by means of modulations and sounds. Thus nature is always the same, always similar to herself, both in light and in sound, in the eye and in the ear; the only difference is that in one she is quicker and more subtle, in the other slower and crasser." Other references are to Part III., chapter V., No. 21, and chapter VIII., Nos. 8, 9, 10, 16.

In accordance with the terms of a fund established anonymously, a course of lectures will be delivered at Yale by professors from Harvard. The introductory lecture by President Eliot was on November 13, on 'Resemblances and Differences among American Universities.' Professor Palmer will give seven lectures on 'Some Aspects of Ethics,' and Professor Münsterberg will give one lecture.

Professor Wilhelm Ostwald, of the University of Leipzig, has completed his courses at Harvard University, and since January 25 has been giving two series of lectures at Columbia University, one on 'The Relations of Energy to Life and Thought' before the department of psychology, and one on 'Physical Chemistry' before the chemical department.

The *Frankfurter Zeitung* announces that the faculty of philosophy at Giessen will issue hereafter its diploma in the German language instead of in Latin. This innovation by a German university body will, the *Zeitung* hopes, result in discarding the extravagant laudation of the budding *vir doctissimus* incidental to the Latin tradition.

Romualdo Bobba, one of those who have helped the Italian philosophy of to-day to win respect, died on December 14 of the past year. Bobba began life as an ecclesiastic, but gave up this career in 1850. He was an active writer on subjects connected with the history of philosophy and with pedagogy.

The Journal of Philosophy Psychology and Scientific Methods

There is no similar journal in the field of scientific philosophy. It is issued fortnightly and permits the quick publication of short contributions, prompt reviews and timely discussions. The contents of the last five issues are as follows.

Volume II. No. 25. December 7, 1905.

Association and Atomism. FELIX ARNOLD.
The Psychical Complex Called an Interest. LUCINDA PEARL BOGGS.
Discussion: The Issue Between Idealism and Immediate Empiricism. CHARLES M. BAKEWELL.
Reviews and Abstracts of Literature. Journals and New Books. Notes and News.

Volume II. No. 26. December 21, 1905.

The Relation of Psychology to the Philosophy of Religion. F. C. FRENCH.
Discussion: The Knowledge Experience Again. JOHN DEWEY.
Universals: A Reply. WILMON H. SHELDON.
Reviews and Abstracts of Literature. Journals and New Books. Notes and News. Index.

Volume III. No. 1. January 4, 1906.

The Transcendence of Knowledge. WILLIAM ERNEST HOCKING.
Psychology and the Logical Judgment with Reference to Realism. J. A. LEIGHTON.
Societies: Section of Anthropology and Psychology of the New York Academy of Sciences. R. S. WOODWORTH.
Reviews and Abstracts of Literature. Journals and New Books. Notes and News.

Volume III. No. 2. January 18, 1906.

The Nature of Feeling. HENRY RUTGERS MARSHALL.
The Terms 'Conscious' and 'Consciousness.' JOHN DEWEY.
Discussion: Rejoinder. PERCY HUGHES.
The Privacy of Consciousness. WENDELL T. BUSH.
Dr. Baird's Criticism of the Iowa Studies in Psychology. JAMES BURT MINER.
Reviews and Abstracts of Literature. Journals and New Books. Notes and News.

Volume III. No. 3. February 1, 1903.

The Definition of 'Feeling.' H. N. GARDINER.
The Term 'Feeling.' MARGARET FLOY WASHBURN.
Discussion: Professor James's 'Hole.' HERBERT NICHOLS.
Societies: The Fifth Meeting of the American Philosophical Association.
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